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Abstract
In peer selection agents must choose a subset of
themselves for an award or a prize. As agents are
self-interested, we want to design algorithms that
are impartial, so that an individual agent cannot af-
fect their own chance of being selected. This prob-
lem has broad application in resource allocation
and mechanism design and has received substan-
tial attention in the artificial intelligence literature.
Here, we present a novel algorithm for impartial
peer selection, PEERNOMINATION, and provide a
theoretical analysis of its accuracy. Our algorithm
possesses various desirable features. In particular,
it does not require an explicit partitioning of the
agents, as previous algorithms in the literature. We
show empirically that it achieves higher accuracy
than the exiting algorithms over several metrics.
1 Introduction
Peer selection, where agents must choose a subset of them-
selves for an award or a prize, is one of the pillars for quality
assessment in scientific contexts and beyond. While current
methods rely on expert panels, there is increasing attention to
how to design trustworthy mechanisms that improve the ac-
curacy and reliability of the outcome, keeping the procedure
simple and cheap. The latter is particularly relevant in open
online courses [Piech et al., 2013], where hiring professional
graders is prohibitively expensive. Indeed, even IJCAI 2020
is implementing a portion of this system, requiring authors
who submit papers to agree to be reviewers themselves.
The importance of having an “objective” assessment in
conference reviewing has been brought to light by the famous
NIPS experiment [Langford, 2015; Shah et al., 2018]: of all
papers submitted to NIPS 2014, 10% were reviewed twice by
two independent committees which, astonishingly, agreed on
less than half of the accepted papers in their pool. Whether
the outcome was due to bias, incompetence or simply well-
thought disagreement is still unclear. What is clear though is
that the current solutions show undesirable properties.
Methods for impartial peer selection, where self-interested
individuals assess one another in such a way that none of
them has an incentive to misrepresent their evaluation, have
a long standing tradition in economics, e.g., [Douceur, 2009;
Holzman and Moulin, 2013; de Clippel et al., 2008], which
has in turn encouraged several groups in artificial intelli-
gence and computer science more broadly to investigate these
problems, e.g., [Kurokawa et al., 2015; Alon et al., 2011;
Xu et al., 2019; Aziz et al., 2019].
The interest in such methods has culminated in a pi-
lot scheme by the US National Science Foundation (NSF)
[Naghizadeh and Liu, 2013], called for by Merrifield and
Saari [2009], in which each principal investigator (PI) was
asked to rank 7 proposals from other PIs. The rankings were
then combined using the Borda score with the additional
truth-telling incentive of receiving a bonus the closer one gets
to the average of the other reviewers’ marks. Though this
method is not impartial, and leads to a Keynesian beauty con-
test [Keynes, 1936], the results were encouraging.
Research in artificial intelligence and economics has led
to a number of proposals for algorithms choosing a set of k
agents from amongst themselves, commonly known as the
peer selection problem. We review some of the most promi-
nent ones here to which we will compare our proposal.
Credible Subset [Kurokawa et al., 2015]. In Credible Sub-
set (CS), reviewers assign scores to their allocated pro-
posals and the potential manipulators, i.e., the reviewers
that could be within the k funded ones, are also selected
to be funded, with a given probability. While the system
is strategy-proof, it will yield an empty set of funded
proposals in a number of cases [Aziz et al., 2016].
Dollar Raffle [de Clippel et al., 2008]. The Dollar Raffle
method (DR) consists of reviewers distributing a score
in the interval [0,1] to their reviews rather than indepen-
dently allocating them as in (CS).
Exact Dollar Partition [Aziz et al., 2019] Reviewers are
clustered at random and rank peers in different clusters.
Using a randomized rounding scheme based on the
the shares computed with the method of de Clippel et
al. [2008], the top proposals of each cluster are selected,
depending on their clusters’ importance. Dollar Partition
is strategy-proof and has been shown to be the most
accurate available method [Aziz et al., 2019].
We compare our algorithm against two more basic proce-
dures: Vanilla, which selects the k agents with the highest to-
tal Borda score based on the reviews received; and Partition,
which, instead, divides the agents into a set of clusters and se-
lects a predetermined number of them from each (typically k
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divided by the number of clusters) as rated by the agents from
the other clusters. Notice that, unlike Partition, Vanilla is not
impartial but is commonly used as a baseline for comparison.
Relevant recent developments with a different focus use
voting rules to aggregate ranks (e.g., k-Partite [Kahng et al.,
2018], including the Committee [Kahng et al., 2018] and
Divide-and-Rank [Xu et al., 2019]) algorithms. Other meth-
ods are approval-based but only focus on single agent se-
lection: Permutation [Fischer and Klimm, 2014] and Slic-
ing [Bousquet et al., 2014]. Additional work in this area
also focuses on assignment and calibration issues [Wang and
Shah, 2019; Lian et al., 2018].
Our Contribution. We present PEERNOMINATION, an im-
partial peer selection method for scenarios where n agents
review and are reviewed by m others, with the goal of se-
lecting k of them. Each proposal is considered independently
and it is selected only if it falls in the top knm of the major-
ity of its reviewers’ (partial) rankings, using a probabilistic
completion if such number is not an integer. This way we
relax the exactness requirement, in the sense that our algo-
rithm is not guaranteed to select exactly k proposals every
time. However, under some mild rationality assumptions, the
algorithm does so in expectation. Unlike other well-known
peer reviewing methods, e.g., Exact Dollar Partition (EDP),
PEERNOMINATION does not rely on clustering nor on re-
viewers submitting complete rankings, allowing more flexi-
bility in where and when it may be deployed.
We compare the performance of PEERNOMINATION
against an underlying ground truth ranking when agent rank-
ings are drawn according to a Mallows model [Mallows,
1957; Xia, 2019], exactly deriving its expected accuracy an-
alytically. Moreover, we empirically compare our method
against other peer selection mechanisms, for which ana-
lytic performance bounds are unknown, using a number of
well-known classification measures. Our results show that
PEERNOMINATION improves on the current best perfor-
mance in terms of accuracy known from the literature and re-
lies on milder assumptions on the underlying reviewer graph.
This suggests that relaxing the exactness requirement in peer
selection outcomes can give us an improved performance
with respect to the accuracy of the accepted set.
Paper Structure. In Section 2 we set up the basic terminol-
ogy and notation. Section 3 presents our algorithm and its the-
oretical properties. Section 4 compares its accuracy against
the main existing alternatives, under various metrics.
2 Preliminaries
We work with a set of agents N = {1, 2, ..., n} and an or-
der over them, induced by their index, which represents the
final ranking the agents would have, if they were to be as-
sessed objectively. We refer to this order as the ground truth.
Each agent is assignedm other agents to review and is in turn
reviewed by m others. We represent such m-regular assign-
ment as a functionA : N → 2N and denote i’s review pool as
A(i), while A−1(i) denotes i’s reviewers. It is worth noting
that while generating a random m-regular assignment is easy
for small m (by generating an m-regular bipartite graph),
sampling one uniformly is non-trivial and is an active area
of study (e.g., see [Berger and Mu¨ller-Hannemann, 2010]).
In this paper, we assume uniform sampling to make our theo-
retical analysis tractable in Section 3 but not for experiments
in Section 4. In practice, we observed negligible effect on the
performance of algorithms when using different assignment-
generating procedures. In real-world settings, agents can only
review a limited number of proposals or papers so m is typi-
cally small and constant, given n.
Each reviewer i submits a ranking of their review pool
A(i), which we represent as a strategy σi : A(i) →
{1, ...,m}, where σi(j) gives the rank of j given by i in i’s
review pool. A collection of all declared strategies is called a
profile and is denoted by σ. The unique profile which is con-
sistent with the ground truth is called truthful. After the indi-
vidual preferences are declared, they are aggregated to select
k individuals. We call a peer selection mechanism impartial
or strategyproof if no agent can affect their chances of selec-
tion in any assignment using any strategy.
3 PEERNOMINATION
In this section we present PEERNOMINATION and describe
its performance analytically.
3.1 The Algorithm
A usual requirement for peer selection mechanisms is that it
must return an accepting set exactly of size k [Aziz et al.,
2019; Alon et al., 2011; Kahng et al., 2018]. Though some
approaches investigated relaxing this assumption [Aziz et al.,
2016; Kurokawa et al., 2015], most notably the results by
Bjelde et al. [2017] show that this relaxation can lead to better
optimality approximation. We use this intuition in designing
the following algorithm that returns an accepting set of size k
in expectation.
PEERNOMINATION works as follows: suppose every agent
reviews and is reviewed by m other agents. If an agent is in
the true top k, we expect them to be ranked in the top k pro-
portion (i.e., top knm) of their review pool by the majority of
agents that review them, if these were to report their accurate
rankings. We say that an agent is nominated by a reviewer
if they are in the top k proportion of the reviewer’s declared
ranking, i.e., their review pool. Likewise, we refer to knm as
the nomination quota. Hence, for every agent j, we look at all
reviewers i1, ..., im reviewing j and select j only if they are
nominated by the majority of these reviewers.
As knm is unlikely to be an integer, we consider an agent
nominated for certain if they are among the first b knmc agents
in the review pool, where bxc denotes the whole part of a
positive real number x. If they are in the next position (i.e.,
b knmc+1), we randomly consider them nominated with prob-
ability knm−b knmc, that is, the decimal part of the nomination
quota. Lastly, if the number of review pools an agent is part
of is even, we require them to be nominated by just half of
the review pools, not a strict majority.
A crucial observation is that, since each agent is considered
independently for selection, the algorithm is not guaranteed
to return exactly k agents. However, we will show that the
algorithm is close enough to such number if the reviewers
submit reviews that are close enough to the ground truth and,
moreover, that truth-telling is an equilibrium outcome, i.e.,
PEERNOMINATION is impartial.
2
The PEERNOMINATION algorithm is presented in Algo-
rithm 1. Note that in the algorithm we introduce the slack pa-
rameter ε, which extends the nomination quota accordingly.
As we show next, this is necessary in some settings to achieve
the right expected size of the accepting set.
Algorithm 1 PEERNOMINATION
Input: Assignment A, review profile σ, target quota k, slack
parameter ε
Output: Accepting set S
Set nomQuota := knm+ ε
for all j in N do
Initialise nomCount := 0
for all i ∈ A−1(j) do
if σi(j) ≤ bnomQuotac then
increment nomCount by 1
else if σi(j) = bnomQuotac+ 1 then
increment nomCount by 1 with probability
nomQuota− bnomQuotac
end if
end for
if nomCount ≥ dm2 e then
S ← j
end if
end for
return S
3.2 Expected Size and Slack Parameter
We now derive the expected size of the accepting set returned
by PEERNOMINATION as a function of n,m and k. Since
each agent is considered independently, we just need to derive
the probability of selection for an agent given their ground
truth position. Assume the algorithm is run on an m-regular
assignment and the reviews are truthful. Note that we assume
such assignment is sampled uniformly and so each review
pool is equally likely to be assigned to any reviewer. Firstly,
consider the probability of obtaining position y in the sample
of size m, given position r in the underlying ranking. When
drawing the sample, we need to choose y − 1 individuals out
of r − 1 that are above agent r in the ground truth, and then
choosem−y out of n−r that are worse. In total, as expected,
we are choosing m− 1 other agents out of n− 1. Hence:
P[Y = y|R = r] =
(
r − 1
y − 1
)(
n− r
m− y
)/(n− 1
m− 1
)
where Y is a random variable representing the position in
the review pool and R is a random variable representing the
ground truth position.
Denote now the nomination quota by kq := knm and recall
that in any given review pool, top bkqc agents are nominated
for certain and the next position is nominated with the proba-
bility of kq−bkqc. Hence, the probability of being nominated
in any pool from position r in the ranking is, independently:
qr :=
bkqc∑
y=1
P[Y = y|R = r]
+ (kq − bkqc)P[Y = bkqc+ 1|R = r]
(1)
Since each review pool can be regarded as a Bernoulli trial
with probability qr and to be accepted an agent has to be nom-
inated dm/2e times, the probability of being accepted from
position r is given by the cumulative Binomial distribution:
P[accept|R = r] =
m∑
i=dm/2e
(
m
i
)
qir(1− qr)m−i (2)
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Figure 1: Probability of being accepted by the algorithm given the
position in the ranking when n = 130 and k = 30.
An illustration of acceptance probabilities as a function of
the ground truth position is shown in Figure 1. We can see that
agents that are well inside top k are almost certain to be ac-
cepted while those well outside of top k are almost certain to
be rejected. The width of the interval around top k for which
the probability is away from the extremes is dictated by m.
Higher m reduces uncertainty by providing more “trials” for
each agent and so narrows the interval.
We can now use the derived probability of acceptance to
calculate the expected size of the accepting set.
Since every individual is accepted independently with
probability P[accept|R = r] and contributes 1 to the
size if they are accepted, the expectation is simply∑n
r=1 P[accept|R = r]. The complexity of this expression
makes it difficult to analyse it explicitly. However, Figure 2a
shows a typical behaviour of the expected size as a function of
m. We observe that this approaches k as m increases. How-
ever, for small values of m the expected size can vary signif-
icantly from k, especially when m is odd (recall that agents
need to get a clear majority in this case, making selection
more difficult). To tackle these issues, we introduce an ad-
ditional parameter ε that allows us to control the size of the
accepting set more finely. If ε is set to a non-zero value (usu-
ally a positive one), we extend the nomination quota in each
review pool by this amount. Usually this increment simply
contributes to the probability that the “fractional nominee” is
nominated. For example, in the setting n = 130,m = 9 and
k = 30, Figure 2a shows the expected size slightly above
27 while our aim is 30. Setting ε = 0.13 yields the ex-
pected size very close to 30. For most practical applications
ε ∈ [−0.05, 0.15], meaning the original algorithm is rather
well-behaved. Note that this is in contrast to other inexact
mechanisms in the literature: Credible Subset must return no
solutions with positive probability [Kurokawa et al., 2015],
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Figure 2: (a) Expected size of the accepting set returned by the algo-
rithm when n = 130, k = 30 and varying m. (b) Expected accuracy
and accepting size for different values of k. n = 130, m = 9 and
ε = 0.15 were used for this figure. The red line shows the expected
accepting size and the blue line shows the accuracy.
while the Dollar Partition method may return as many addi-
tional agents as the number of clusters [Aziz et al., 2016].
Recall that the above analysis assumes reviewers to be ac-
curate. If this assumption fails, we cannot provide any guar-
antees even for the expected size of the accepting set. It is
also easy to construct marginal cases in which everyone or no
one is selected in the worst case scenario.
Example 1. Consider the setting with 3 agents with every-
one reviewing each other and suppose we want to select one
individual (i.e., n = 3,m = 2 and k = 1). Suppose agent
1 reviews 2 above 3, agent 2 reviews 3 above 1 and agent
3 reviews 1 above 2. The nomination quota with ε = 0 is
2
3 and every agent is ranked in the first place once. Hence,
each agent is selected with probability 23 independently and
so there exists a realisation where no one is selected as well
as one where everyone is selected.
In Section 4 we consider a realistic setting that includes
a noise model for the reviews and discuss the accepting size
and the performance of PEERNOMINATION.
3.3 Expected Size and Accuracy
Above we derived the probability of acceptance given a po-
sition in the ground truth, assuming no noise, before intro-
ducing the parameter ε. It is easy to adapt this expression to
include ε: simply update the nomination quota when comput-
ing qr in Equation 1. Hence, let kεq = kq + ε and
qεr :=
bkεqc∑
y=1
P[Y = y|R = r]
+
(
kεq − bkεqc
)
P[Y = bkεq + 1c|R = r]
This gives us P[ε-accept|R = r] for each ground truth posi-
tion by simply replacing qr in Equation 2 by qεr . The expected
size is again given by a similar expression:
E[accepting size] =
n∑
r=1
P[ε-accept|R = r]
It is now in principle easy to derive the expected accuracy
of the algorithm. However, since the algorithm’s output is in-
exact, there are multiple accuracy measures to consider, as
is often the case for classification algorithms [Bishop, 2006].
For example, we might care about how many agents of the
true top k we have selected (recall) or that we do not select
too many agents from outside of it (false positive rate). We
focus on the former, which we note is elsewhere referred to
as accuracy [Aziz et al., 2019]. The connection with classifi-
cation metrics will be further explored in Section 4. Now, the
expected recall is simply the sum of the probability of selec-
tion over all true top k positions, divided by k:
E[recall] =
1
k
k∑
r=1
P[ε-accept|R = r]
Again, the complexity of these expressions hinders theoret-
ical analysis but Figure 2b shows a typical output for different
values of k.
While its performance appears good in isolation, it is im-
portant to compare PEERNOMINATION with other peer selec-
tion mechanisms which we do in Section 4.
3.4 Strategyproofness and Monotonicity
Our main desired property is that of impartiality or strate-
gyproofness. Luckily, this comes almost for free since the
agents are chosen independently.
Proposition 1. The mechanism is strategyproof, i.e., no agent
can affect their chances of selection using any strategy.
We also want the algorithm to be monotonic, having better
reviews does not hurt the chances of selection.
Proposition 2. The mechanism is monotonic, i.e., if a re-
viewer increases their ranking of an agent, that agent’s prob-
ability of selection is not decreased.
Proof. Suppose j is reviewed by i and consider the probabil-
ity of selecting j given the original review of i, and a modified
one where j is ranked higher. There are three cases:
1. j was already inside the integer part of the nomination
quota in the original review or j is still completely out-
side of the the nomination quota in the modified review.
In both cases j was already certain to be nominated or
not nominated, respectively, by i, hence their probability
does not change.
2. j moves from being a fractional nominee to being a full
nominee increasing the chances of nomination (by 1 −
(kq−bkqc)), hence increasing their chances of selection.
3. j moves from being not nominated to be fractionally
nominated increasing the chance of nomination (by kq−
bkqc), hence increasing the chances of selection.
In all cases j’s chances of selection do not decrease, complet-
ing the proof.
Notice that in the definition of the algorithm we stipulate
that ε is part of the input. One could be tempted to calculate ε
after collecting the reviews in order to adjust the output size to
be exactly k, however this is undesirable for several reasons.
Firstly, the run of the algorithm is non-deterministic, hence it
might be impossible to find a value of ε that guarantees such
output size on every run. Secondly, and most importantly, this
would eliminate strategyproofness since now an agent could
estimate that reporting an untruthful review could decrease
the size of the accepting set, hence forcing the mechanism to
increase ε and so increase their chances of selection.
4
4 Simulation Experiments
We draw a novel connection between inexact peer selec-
tion and the literature on classification in machine learning
[Bishop, 2006]. With this empirical framework we run exper-
iments to demonstrate that PEERNOMINATION outperforms
other mechanisms proposed.
4.1 Classification Measures
The usual and intuitive way to measure the “accuracy” of an
exact peer-selection mechanism is counting how many agents
from the top k positions in the ground truth have been se-
lected, as a proportion of all k agents selected. This allows us
to compare exact peer-selection mechanisms as was done in
[Aziz et al., 2019]. However, comparison with inexact mech-
anisms is less obvious. Since the accepting set is not guar-
anteed to be of size k exactly, any output with more than k
agents may artificially increase the accuracy of the inexact
mechanism and the opposite for any smaller output. One op-
tion is to measure the accuracy as a proportion of the output
size, however, this approach will overrate outputs that are ac-
curate but much smaller than k.
Inexactness allows us to view peer selection as a classifica-
tion problem in which selection means positive classification.
We can then view the selected agents from the true top k as
true positives and the non-selected agents from outside the
true top k as true negatives. We apply the standard classifi-
cation accuracy measures [Bishop, 2006] such as recall and
precision to PEERNOMINATION to analyse its performance.
More formally, let S be the set of agents selected by the
algorithm and S+ = {r ∈ S | rank(r) ≤ k} the set of
selected agents that are in the true top k, i.e., true positives
(TP). Similarly, we can use S− = {r ∈ S | rank(r) > k}
for false positives (FP). Hence we can define: TP = |S+|,
FP = |S−| = |S| − TP, true negatives TN = |{r /∈ S |
rank(r) > k}| = n−k−FP, and false negatives FN = |{r /∈
S | rank(r) ≤ k}| = n− |S| − TN.
We can now look at some of the normal performance met-
rics: Positive Predictive Value (PPV) (aka Precision), True
Positive Rate (TPR) (aka Recall) and False Positive Rate
(FPR), defined as follows:
PPV :=
TP
TP + FP
TPR :=
TP
TP + FN
FPR :=
FP
TN + FP
Furthermore, we can view the slack parameter ε as the sen-
sitivity threshold akin to the probability threshold in the ma-
chine learning literature (see e.g., [Flach, 2012]).
This suggests a method to construct the Precision-Recall
(PR) and Receiver-Operator Characteristic Curve (ROC):
vary ε such that the nomination quota varies between 0 and
m and measure the Precision, Recall and False Positive Rate
at each value. An example is presented in Figure 3.
The curves show the trade off between sensitivity (TRP)
and inclusivity (FPR). As we follow the ROC curve, which
corresponds to gradually increasing the nomination quota, the
(TPR) increases quickly, i.e., we do not need to accept too
many extra agents to select all the deserving agents. On the
other hand, we can still achieve TPR of around 0.8 with the
FPR very close to 0. This shows that we can select around
80% of the agents in the true top k if we concentrate on not
selecting the “undeserving” individuals. While the curves are
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Figure 3: ROC and PR curves for PEERNOMINATION. They were
computed analytically with n = 120,m = 8, k = 25.
interesting on their own, we want to be able to compare them
to other peer-selection mechanisms, so an important direction
is finding a generalizable way of constructing curves for other
peer-selection mechanisms.
4.2 Experimental Setup
We extend the testing framework developed by Aziz et
al. [2019] and using methods from PREFLIB [Mattei and
Walsh, 2017; 2013]. Our code and data is available online 1.
As in Aziz et al. [2019], we set n = 120 and tested the algo-
rithm on various values of k andm. The test values for k were
15, 20, 25, 30, 35 and the test values for m were 5, 7, 9, 11.
For the algorithms that rely on the partition, we chose the
number of partitions, l, to be 4.
For each setting of the parameters we generated a random
m-regular assignment matching reviewers to reviewees. As
in other works, we model he reviews of each agent using a
Mallows Model [Mallows, 1957]. In a Mallows model we
provide a (random) ground truth ranking pi and a noise pa-
rameter φ. If we set φ = 0 then agents will always report
pi as their ranking, i.e., they are all exactly correct. As we
increase φ agents will report increasingly inaccurate rank-
ings as a function of the Kendall tau distance between pi
and all possible rankings. Note that each agent draws from
this distribution independently. Hence, by varying φ we can
test the robustness of our algorithms to errors in the rank-
ings submitted by the agents. Mallows models have a long
history in machine learning and group decision-making as
they can simulate noisy observations of a ground truth rank-
ing, and be sampled efficiently [Mallows, 1957; Xia, 2019;
Lu and Boutilier, 2011].
The experiment was repeated 1000 times for each setting,
after which the average recall was calculated giving us high
confidence in our results. For PEERNOMINATION, we used
theoretical estimates of ε to achieve the right expected size of
the accepting set. The error bars in Figures 4 and 5 represent
1 standard deviation of the data. In line with the observation
in [Aziz et al., 2019], varying the dispersion parameter φ for
Mallows’ noise did not have significant effect on the accu-
racy of all algorithms until we approach φ = 1.0 when all
reviewers report a completely random ordering. The results
for φ = 0.5 are presented in Figure 4.
PEERNOMINATION does not require an explicit partition-
ing making it more flexible. Another issue with partitioning,
as pointed out in [Aziz et al., 2019], is that the performance
1https://github.com/nmattei/peerselection
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Figure 5: Results of the forced size experiment: PEERNOMINATION
and EDP are always guaranteed to return the same number of agents.
of both EDP and Partition degrade as we increase the number
of clusters. In another test we varied the number of clusters `
between 2 and 10. We saw a decrease in performance of about
3−4% for the partition based methods while the performance
of PEERNOMINATION remained constant.
In another testing setup we adopted a slightly different pro-
cedure in order to ensure a level comparison. In each sim-
ulation, we generate a random m-regular assignment, run
PEERNOMINATION using the target k as an input, measure
the size of the output and run EDP using this size as the input
k. A similar experiment was also performed for the inexact
version of Dollar Partition in Aziz et al. [2016]. This ensures
that during each simulation both algorithms return the same
number of agents for selection. The results of this comparison
are presented in Figure 5.
4.3 Results
Again following Aziz et al. [2019] and depicted in Figure
4, we compared a selection of impartial peer selection algo-
rithms and Vanilla (Borda count). Borda is a classic social
choice rule that is known not to be strategyproof but is opti-
mal in the ordinal peer-ranking setting under the assumption
of no noise [Caragiannis et al., 2016], and thus represents
an optimistic baseline in the presence of no manipulators.
PEERNOMINATION outperforms EDP significantly in the the
majority of the settings we have considered. The only setting
where EDP outperforms PEERNOMINATION is at m = 5,
which is a low information setting, where reviewers are given
a nomination quota fractionally above 1. However, our algo-
rithm improves quickly with m. Even at m = 9 shown in
Figure 4 PEERNOMINATION approaches the performance of
Borda across the values of k we considered.
It is worth noting that PEERNOMINATION tends to re-
turn a slightly larger than k set on average (usually < 1
additional agent). Nevertheless, even if the testing forces
PEERNOMINATION and EDP to return the same number of
agents every time, we see that PEERNOMINATION has an
overall advantage as shown in Figure 5. Again, EDP only
does better in a low information setting (m = 5).
5 Conclusion
There are many avenues for future work: PEERNOMINATION,
which already does not rely on predefined clustering, can be
extended to not require an m-regular assignment. Moreover,
each reviewer does not even need to declare a full ranking
over their review pool, but simply declare the nominees for
the selection and one nominee to be fractionally selected.
This also suggests that there might be a possible extension
of the algorithm which makes use of the declared rankings in
full, as this data is currently discarded.
Crucially, the usefulness of our algorithm depends on re-
turning an accepting set of size close to k. We saw that this
can be achieved using the parameter ε. However, we saw that
very high levels of noise can affect the size of the accepting
set. This suggests that an important research direction will be
that of testing different models of agent behaviour in detail.
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